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This paper considers corporate equilibria in a two period endogenized asset general
equilibrium model for a class of prot maximizing objective functions of the rms introduced
in Stiefenhofer (2009). It shows by means of a particular case that for a xed nancial
policy, every extensive form stock market equilibrium can be translated into a reduced form
equilibrium. This suggests determinateness of corporate equilibria for varying nancial
parameters. A change in the rm's nancial policy changes the production set available to
it in the next period, hence real eects.
1 Introduction
The Modigliani and Miller corporate nance theorem [7] states that the value of the
rm is independent of its nancial policies. This result was originally derived in a series
of papers in a partial equilibrium set up. The rst generalization of this theorem to a
general equilibrium framework is due to Stiglitz [10],[11]. Beyond a one period general
equilibrium model, DeMarzo [2], Magill and Quinzii [6], and Due and Shafer [4], conrm
the validity of this result for the case of incomplete markets. These papers have in
common that they derive corporate equilibrium properties for exogenous asset structures
with production sets independent of the nancial activities of the rms. This dichotomy
implies non-trivial economic equilibrium consequences. For example, exogenous asset
formation models essentially ignore the nancing of the rm since production sets are
xed, thus the Modigliani and Miller theorem holds under classical assumptions.
This paper improves on the corporate nance theory derived under exogenous asset
structures considered in classical GEI models of production [3],[5]. It considers a simple
version of the relevance of nancial policy theorem for a two period general equilibrium
model with endogenous production sets and incomplete markets [8],[9]. In this model,
endogenized production sets available to rms are not independent of the nancial activ-
ities of the rm. In the long run, rms issue stocks, buy capital and build up production
capacity. In the short run, they choose production activities in installed production sets
which maximize their prots. Inputs of production are nanced with the revenue gener-
ated with the sell of production outputs. Hence, nancial policies are non-neutral. This
allows to consider corporate nance theorems from a new perspective.
The paper is organized in four parts. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
presents the result. Section 4 is a conclusion.
Contact address: Department of Economics and Related Studies University of York.
ps515@york.ac.uk.
12 The Model
We consider a two period t 2 T = f0;1g model with technological uncertainty in period 1
represented by states of nature. An element in the set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
uncertain events is denoted s 2 f1;:::;Sg, where by convention s = 0 represents the certain
event in period 0. We count in total (S + 1) states of nature.
The economic agents are the j 2 f1;:::;ng producers and i 2 f1;:::;mg consumers
which are characterized by assumptions of smooth economies. There are k 2 f1;:::;lg
physical commodities and j 2 f1;:::;ng nancial assets, referred to as stocks. In fact,
stocks are the only nancial assets considered here. Physical goods are traded on each of
the (S + 1) spot markets. Producers issue stocks which are traded at s = 0, yielding a
payo in the next period at uncertain state s 2 f1;:::;Sg. The quantity of stocks issued
by rm j 2 f1;:::;ng is denoted zj 2 R , where
Pn
j=1 zj = ^ z.
There are in total l(S+1) physical goods available for consumption. The consumption








i=1 xi = x. The consumption space for each
consumer i 2 f1;:::;mg is Xi = R
l(S+1)
++ , the strictly positive orthant. The associated price
system is a collection of vectors represented by p = (p(0);p(s);:::;p(S)) 2 R
l(S+1)
++ , with
p(s) = (p1(s);:::;pl(s)) 2 Rl
++, the strictly positive orthant. Each consumer i 2 f1;:::;mg
is endowed with initial resources !i 2 
, where 
 = RlT
++, and !i = (!i(0);!i(1)) a
collection of strictly positive vectors. Denote an initial resource vector at time period
t 2 T = f0;1g, !i(t) = (!1
i(t);:::;!l
i(t)) 2 Rl
++, and the sum of total initial resources, Pm
i=1 !i = !.
In total, there are n nancial assets traded in period t = 0. Denote the quantity vector
of stocks purchased by consumer i 2 f1;:::;mg, zi = (zi(1);:::;zi(n)) 2 Rn
+, a collection
of quantities of stocks purchased from producers j 2 f1;:::;ng, and denote
Pm
i=1 zi = z,
with associated stock price system q = (q(1);:::;q(n)) 2 Rn
++. Denote producer j's period
one vector of capital purchase yj(0) 2 Rl
 , and denote his period two state dependent
net activity vector yj(s) = (y1
j(s);:::;yl
j(s)) 2 Rl. Let yj(t = 1) = (yj(s);:::;yj(S)) 2 RlS
denote the collection of state dependent period t=1 net activity vectors. A period two
input of production for every s 2 f1;:::;Sg is by convention denoted yk
j(s) < 0, and a
production output in state s 2 f1;:::;Sg satises yk
j(s)  0. For notational convenience,
we treat quantity vectors as column vectors, and price vectors as row vectors, hence, we
drop the notation for transposing vectors, whenever possible.
Each rm j 2 f1;:::;ng issues stocks zj at stock price qj in period one in order to
build up production capacity. A rm's total cash acquired via stock market determines
the upper bound of the total value of production capacity it can install in the same period.
Denote this liquidity constraint qjzj = Mj, where Mj 2 R+ is a non-negative real number
and zj 2 R  a feasible nancial policy of the rm j 2 f1;:::;ng. Mj constraints the
quantity of capital y(0) 2 Rl
  a producer j can purchase at spot price system p(0) 2
Rl
++. The quantity of intermediate goods yj(0) purchased in period one determines a
correspondence jjZ. This correspondence denes the technology of the rm at feasible
nancial policy Z. Let the production set available to each producer j 2 f1;:::;ng in
period two be described by this technology, jjZ : Rm
  ! Rn
 , a correspondence dened
on the set of period two inputs, and denote it Yjjz  Rl. Let S denote the set of all
exogenously given states of nature. Then for each producer j 2 f1;:::;ng let the t = 1
one period production set be dened by a map jjZ with domain Rm
   R++ and range
2Rn
   R++, and denote it Yjjz(s)  Rl(S+1), where m + n = l. 1
The sequential optimization structure of the rm is shown in equation (1). This
objective function has the main property of being independent of any assigned utilities of
the owners of the rm [9].
argmax










 zi(j)   q^ zj =  p(0)  yj(0)







Consumers play the same role in this production model as in the classical GEI model
with production. They invest into rms because they want to transfer wealth between
future uncertain states of nature, and to smooth out consumption across states of nature.
Each consumer i 2 f1;:::;mg purchases stocks zi at stock price q in period one in return for
a dividend stream in the next period. The consumer's optimization problem is to maximize
utility subject to a sequence of (S + 1) budget constraints. Each consumer i 2 f1;:::;mg
is characterized by the standard assumptions for smooth economies introduced in Debreu
[1].









p(0)  (xi(0)   !i(0)) =  qzi
p(s)2(xi(s)   !i(1)) = (p1;jZ)i(zi)
)
; (2)
where ij = zi(j)[
P
i zi(j)] 1 is the proportion of total payo of nancial asset j 2
f1;:::;ng hold by consumer i 2 f1;:::;mg after trade at the stock market took place
in period one.  is the full payo matrix of the economy of dimension (S  n).
Algebraically, each i 2 f1;:::;mg
(xi;zi)argmax
n





A competitive equilibrium of the production economy dened by the initial resource
vector ! 2 
 is a price pair (p;q) 2 S  Rn
++ if equality between demand and supply
of physical goods and nancial assets is satised in all states of nature, s = 0;1;:::;S.




+  Rl(S+1)n  Rn
  of consumption, production and nancial quantities.
(i)
Pm
















i=1 (zi)j = 1 for all j 2 f1;:::;ng
(4)
Stiefenhofer [8] shows that equilibria for this stock market model always exist.
3 Result
We rst introduce a reduced form equilibrium denition for the general equilibrium model
of production with incomplete markets. This model has the property that production sets
1Assumptions of smooth production sets and utility functions apply. These are introduced in detail
in Stiefenhofer (2009).
3are independent of nancial activities of the rms. The result shows that every extensive
form equilibrium can be simplied to a reduced form equilibrium for any feasible xed
nancial policy. The result suggest real equilibrium eects for an equilibrium parametriza-
tion over a set of feasible nancial policies.
Denition 1 (RFE) A reduced form stock market equilibrium (p;q) with associated equi-
librium allocations (x;);(y) for generic initial resources ! 2 
, and each producer
j 2 f1;:::;ng maximizing long run prots satises:
(i) (xi;i)argmax
n









qzj = p(0)  yj(0) for all s 2 S
)
8 j 2 f1;:::;ng
(iii)
Pm





i zi(j) + zj;
Pm
i (i)j = 1, 8j 2 f1;:::;ng
Theorem 1 (i) If ( p;  q) is an extensive form equilibrium with associated equilibrium al-
locations (( xj^ z ;  z);( yj^ z ; ^ z)) (EFE) for generic initial resources ! 2 
; then ( p;  q); is a
reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations (( xj  ;  );( yj )) (RFE)






i=1  zi(j) + ^ zj for j = 1;:::;n (5)
(ii) If ( p;  q) is a reduced form equilibrium with associated equilibrium allocations (( xj  ;  ),
( yj )) (RFE) for generic initial resources ! 2 
; then ( p;  q); is an extensive form equilib-
rium with associated equilibrium allocations (( xj^ z ;  z);( yj^ z ; ^ z)) (EFE) for generic initial
resources ! 2 
; for any ^ zj 
Pm
i=1  zi(j) for j = 1;:::;n satisfying
Xm
i=1  zi(j) + ^ zj =
Xm
i=1
 ij for j = 1;:::;n: (6)
Lemma 1  xij  is a solution of the reduced form problem
max
n
u(x;)i : xij  2 Bi
o
(7)
if and only if,  xij  2 Bi; and
@u( xij )i \ NBi( xij ) 6= f0g (8)
is satised.
Proof 1 (Lemma 1) (i)  xij  is a solution of utility max (RFE) if and only if  xij  2 Bi
and
intUi;  xij  \ Bi = ?:








xij  2 R
l(S+1)
++ : P xij   P xij
0
  ;8 xij  2 Bi;8 xij
0
  2 intUi;  xij 
o





xij  2 R
l(S+1)
++ : P  xij   P xij
0
  ;8 xij
0
  2 intUi;  xij 
o
:







  2 Ui;  xj  : P  xij   P xij
0
  ;8 xij
0
  2 Ui;  xij 
o





8 xij  2 Bi : P xij   P  xij  ;
o
, P 2 NBi( xij )i
hence, there exists p such that @u( xij )i \ NB( xj )i 6= f0g is satised.
(ii) Suppose that  xij  2 Bi; and there exists P 2 @u( xij )i \ NBi( xij )i; P 6= 0:
If  xij  is not a solution of the (RFE) utility maximization problem, then there exists
 xij  0 2 intUi;  xij  \ Bi: Since P 2 @u( xij )i, we have
P xij  0 > P  xij 
But since P 2 NBi( xij ) and  xij  0 2 Bi; it follows that P  xij  0  P  xij  which
contradicts that  xij  0 is preferred to  xij .
Lemma 2  yjj  is a solution of
max
n
(p;)j :  yjj  2 Yjj 
o
(9)
if and only if,  yjj  2 Yjj  ; and
@( yj )j \ Yjj  ( yjj ) 6= f0g (10)
is satised.
Proof 2 (Lemma 2) (i)  yjj  is a solution of the (RFE) prot max problem if and only
if  yjj  2 Yjj  and
int yj \ Yjj  = ?:
By the separation theorem for convex sets (appendix), there exists p 2 RlS






yjj  2 R
n : p yjj   p yjj
0
  ;8 yjj  2 Yjj  ;8 yjj
0
  2 intj  yj 
o





yjj  2 R
n : p  yj   p yjj
0
  ;8 yjj
0
  2 intj  yj 
o
:






  2 j;yjj  : p  yjj   p yjj
0
  ;8 yjj
0
  2 j;  yjj 
o




8 yjj  2 Yjj  : p yjj   p  yjj  ;
o
, p 2 NYjj ( yjj )j
hence, there exists p such that @( yjj )j \ Nj;Yjj ( yjj )j 6= f0g is satised.
(ii) Suppose that  yjj  2 Yjj  ; and there exists p 2 @( yjj )j \ NYjj ( yjj )j;p 6= 0:
If  yjj  is not a solution of the prot maximization problem (RFE), then there exists
 yjj  0 2 intj;  yjj  \ Yjj  : Since p 2 @( yjj )j, we have
p  yjj  0 > p  yj z
But since p 2 NYjj ( yjj ) and  yjj  0 2 Yjj  ; it follows that p  yjj  0  p  yjj  which contra-
dicts that  yjj  0 is preferred to  yjj .
Proof 3 (Theorem 1) Part (i). Let us rst show that the reduced form equilibrium allo-
cations (( x;  );( y)) satisfy the rst order conditions (Lemma (1)) @u( xij )i\NBi( xij ) 6=
f0g and  xij  2 Bi; and (Lemma(2)) @( yj )j \ Yjj  ( yjj ) 6= f0g and  yjj  2 Yjj  ; so that
the conditions (i) and (ii) in the (RFE) are satised. The rst order conditions for the
consumer's problem in the (EFE) are





;and i( y;  p) = 0
and can be rewritten as
p   xij  = p  !i + ( y;  p)
Xn






i=1  zi(j) + ^ zj; for all j = 1;:::;n, so that (lemma (1)) above holds for any
feasible ^ zj 6
Pm
i=1  zi(j) for all j = 1;:::;n: The rm's problem in (EFE) is to
argmax










 zi(j)   qzj =  p(0)  yj(0)






For any feasible ^ zj 6
Pm
i=1  zi(j) the problem of the producer reduces to
argmax
(  yj (s))j
nXS
s=1  p(s) yjj  (s) : yjj  (s) 2 Yjj  (s);s 2 S
o
since feasible ^ zj ) jj^ z (s) =) Yjj^ z (s) for all s 2 S; for which the rst order con-





i=1  zi(j) + ^ zj = 0; for all j = 1;:::;n, and
Pm




j=1  yj(0); Pm




j=1  yjj^ z (s) for all s 2 S hold.
6Part (ii). If (( x;  );( y)) is a (RFE) for implicit ^ zj; for j = 1;:::;n; then the rst order




(  yj (s))j
nXS















 zi(j)   q^ zj =  p(0)  yj(0)







for which the rst order conditions are satised (Lemma (2)), hence  yjj^ z is a solution of
(ii) in (EFE) for feasible ^ zj. Pick any feasible ^ zj and dene
Xm
i=1 zi(j) + ^ zj =  i; for all j = 1;:::;n (13)
such that zi + ^ zj =  i becomes (zi + ^ zj) =  i; then the rst order conditions
for the consumer of the (EFE) (Lemma (1)) are satised for ( xij^ zj ;zi). ( xij^ zj ;zi) is







j=1 ^ zj and
Pm





j=1  yj(0); Pm




j=1  yjj^ z (s) for all s 2 S:
4 Conclusion
This paper studies a simplied version of the Modigliani and Miller theorem. It shows for
a special case of a stock market economy with incomplete markets that nancial policies
have real equilibrium eects. The determinateness of equilibria follows from the structure
imposed on the model. The endogenous asset structure considered improves on the theory
of the rm in general equilibrium with incomplete markets. Firms optimize long and short
run economic activities. In the long run, they issue stocks and buy capital in order to build
up their production sets. In the short run, they maximize short run prots at competitive
prices, taking their production sets as given in each state of nature. The sequential
optimization structure of the rm links the ecient boundary of the production set of the
rm with the sphere of the nancial asset set. Hence, real equilibrium eects.
The paper improves on the implicit assumption present in exogenous asset formation
models that production is automatically nanced. This result should be generalized to
more general asset structures. This research is well under progress.
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